When Is an Equity Participant Actually a Creditor? The Effects of In re AFI Holding on Ponzi Scheme Victims and the Good Faith Defense by Cash, James Butler, Jr.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 98 | Issue 2 Article 5
2009
When Is an Equity Participant Actually a Creditor?
The Effects of In re AFI Holding on Ponzi Scheme
Victims and the Good Faith Defense
James Butler Cash Jr.
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Securities Law Commons
Click here to let us know how access to this document benefits you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cash, James Butler Jr. (2009) "When Is an Equity Participant Actually a Creditor? The Effects of In re AFI Holding on Ponzi Scheme
Victims and the Good Faith Defense," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 98 : Iss. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol98/iss2/5
NOTES
When Is an Equity Participant Actually a Creditor?
The Effects of In re AFI Holding on Ponzi Scheme
Victims and the Good Faith Defense
James Butler Cash Jr.'
INTRODUCTION
T HE recent discovery and subsequent fallout from the fraud perpetrated
by Bernard L. Madoff has returned Ponzi schemes to the forefront
of the investment community. The size of the deception is monumental
by any standard. Officials at the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) described a level of deception that was "stunning" and "of epic
proportions."2 According to Madoff's own estimations, before the SEC filed
its complaint in the Southern District of New York, his investment advisory
business had been "a giant Ponzi scheme," the firm had been insolvent
for years, and the losses "from this fraud were at least $50 billion."3 As
the tally of victims in this fraud has climbed, 4 attorneys for the aggrieved
investors and news agencies alike have scrambled to find new wrinkles in
Ponzi scheme jurisprudence.'
Investor-victims of Ponzi schemes typically find their options for
recourse severely limited or altogether nonexistent.6 A victim's prospect of
collecting all or any of his or her investment is fraught with obstacles, the
I James Butler Cash Jr. is a Juris Doctor candidate at the University of Kentucky College
of Law. He would like to thank Professor Christopher W. Frost for the invaluable help he
provided on this Note. He would also like to thank his mother and father for their love and
support.
2 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Bernard L. Madoff for Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi
Scheme (Dec. II, 2oo8), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2oo8/zoo8-z93.htm.
3 Id.
4 Madoff's Vicim List, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2oo9, http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/docu-
ments/st madoff victims_2oo8 1215.html.
5 See generally Jane J. Kim et al., Investors May Have to Surrender Gains, WALL ST. J., Dec.
15, 2oo8, at A6; Carrie Coolidge, Lessons forMadoff Investors from the Bayou Fund Ponzi Scheme,
FoRBEs, Dec. 12, zoo8, http://www.forbes.com/ (search "Lessons for Madoff Investors"; then
follow "Lessons for Madoff Investors From the Bayou Fund Ponzi Scheme" hyperlink).
6 See Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and Preferential
Transfers, 72 AM. BANKI. L.J. 57 (1998).
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largest of which is the shortfall of money as compared to the claims of the
defrauded investors.'
In most Ponzi scheme cases, the disparity between the actual funds
after the collapse and the claims of the defrauded investors eventually
drive the scam into bankruptcy protection.' This disparity often leads to a
shocking revelation for investors of the Ponzi scheme who were fortunate
enough to withdraw their money before the collapse: bankruptcy courts
can, at a minimum, require the return of any profits they received from the
investment. 9 A bankruptcy court can also recover payments representing
the investor's initial investment.l° The result is that investors who withdrew
money from a Ponzi scheme years before its collapse are surprised by
a bankruptcy trustee knocking on their doors years later," regardless of
whether the withdrawn money has been spent.'" The power of courts and
bankruptcy trustees to repossess funds from investors years removed from
their investment in a Ponzi scheme derives from the fraudulent transfer
statutes in the Bankruptcy Code. 13 Subjecting present and past investors
of Ponzi schemes to such an unforgiving remedy may seem grounded
in the maxim "misery loves company"; however, fraudulent transfer law
purports to promote an "equality of distribution" policy, seeking to treat
investors who were financially hurt by fraud the same as those who escaped
the Ponzi scheme in time. 14
Lucky investors who pulled their money from the fraudulent
scheme before its disintegration are provided a statutory defense against
bankruptcy trustees seeking to repossess their investment: the good faith
defense.'" This affirmative defense can be asserted against a bankruptcy
7 Id. at 158-59.
8 See Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 E3d 700, 701 (9th Cir. 2oo8);
Johnson v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 525 F3d 805, 8o9-8IO (9th Cir. 2oo8); Bayou Accredited
Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners (In re Bayou Group, LLC), 396 B.R. 8Io, 823-824
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2oo8).
9 McDermott, supra note 6, at 187.
10 Id.
ii See Kim et al., supra note 5 (where investor who withdrew his funds from Bayou Group
two years before the collapse was required to pay back his profits); Mark Gimein, Madoff
Madness: Even Investors Who Think They're Safe Are Wrong, THE BIG MONEY, Dec. 16, 2oo8, http://
www.thebigmoney.com/articles/news/2oo8/I z/i 6/madoff-madness.
iz Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 E3d 750, 761 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1028
('995).
13 1I U.S.C. § 548 (2oo6).
14 See Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners (In re Bayou Group,
LLC), 396 B.R. 81o, 827 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. zoo8); Dan Schechter, Innocent Investor in Ponzi
Scheme May Assert Good-Faith Defense to Fraudulent Transfer Claim Because Surrender of Restitution
Claim in Exchangefor Full Payment Constitutes "Reasonably Equivalent Value," COM. FIN. NEWSL.,
Apr. 21, 2008, at 33.
15 See I I U.S.C. § 548(c) (2006); McDermott, supra note 6, at 175-81.
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trustee attempting to avoid transfers from a debtor-Ponzi scheme to its
earlier investors. 6 In sum, the defense allows investors who received
distributions from the Ponzi scheme without knowledge of the fraud
to keep an amount equal to their principal investment. For those who
redeemed their investment knowing of or suspecting the fraud, the good
faith defense is foreclosed and the investors must return the entire sum
received from the scheme, regardless of whether the payouts from the
fund constituted profits or a return of principal. 7 Besides ignorance of the
fraud during the distribution, investors must also establish that they took
distributions from the Ponzi scheme for value.' This requirement means
that the Ponzi scheme must have received some valuable consideration
when it transferred funds to an investor.
Ponzi schemes created and operated in the form of partnerships
provide an interesting dilemma for courts when analyzing the good faith
defense. The Bankruptcy Code includes limited partnership interests in
its definition of "equity securities." '9 Under past case law, a distribution to
an investor in exchange for equity securities did not provide the debtor-
Ponzi scheme with "value.""0 In light of these past decisions, an investor
who exchanged a partnership interest in a Ponzi scheme to redeem his
principal investment would fail to satisfy the second prong of the good faith
defense: "giving for value."'" Bankruptcy scholar Professor Dan Schechter
explains why limited partners and other equity participants fail to meet the
second prong of the good faith defense as follows:
[A] willing equity participant (such as a partnership
investor) does not have a "claim." A "claim" is a "right
to payment" under [the applicable statute]. An equity
participant does not have a "right" to payment. An
investor has a "hope" of payment.2
16 See McDermott, supra note 6, at 175-81; Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners-A (In re
Agric. Research & Tech. Group, Inc.), 916 F2d 5z8,535-36 (9th Cir. 199o); In reBayou Group,
LLC, 396 B.R. at 843-45.
17 See McDermott, supra note 6, at 175-8I; Hayes, 916 F zd at 535-36; In re Bayou Group,
LLC, 396 B.R. at 843-45.
18 11 U.S.C. § 548(c).
19 11 U.S.C. § I o I(i6)(B) (2oo6).
20 See Hayes, 916 E2d at 54o; McConnell v. Estate of Butler, 402 F.2d 362, 366 (9th Cir.
1968) (citing Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 F.zd 756, 757 (5th Cir. 1935)) (finding that reason-
ably equivalent value was not established when a corporation repurchased its own stock, an
equity claim); Le Cafr Creme, Ltd. v. Le Roux (In re Le Caf6 Creme, Ltd.), 244 B.R. 221,
239-41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that debtor did not receive adequate consideration
upon the repurchase of its stock, an equity claim).
21 1I U.S.C. § 548(c).
22 Schechter, supra note 14 (citation omitted).
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The Ninth Circuit, however, does not agree with Professor Schechter.
In a recent decision, the court in In re AFI Holding, Inc. (hereinafter "AFI
Holding"), determined that the investor-partners, upon purchase of the
fraudulent partnership interests, had in fact exchanged those interests "for
a proportionately reduced restitution claim." 3 With such a pronouncement,
transfers of principal investments to investor-partners in exchange for
equity interests in the partnerships were deemed to be of sufficient value
to satisfy § 548(c) and, therefore, unassailable by a bankruptcy trustee of
the defunct parmnership-Ponzi scheme.1
4
AFI Holding marks a break from past precedent. The Ninth Circuit
decided that the equity interest the Ponzi scheme obtained from investor-
partners constituted value, so as to offset the restitution claims of investor-
partners resulting from the fraud inherent in the Ponzi scheme. Restitution
can best be termed a debt owed from one party to another, and forgiveness
of debt can act as sufficient consideration for § 548(c).15 The problem,
however, is that "[a]n outstanding equity interest is not a 'debt."'2 16 Thus,
exchanging an equity interest for a reduced claim of restitution should
never provide the value required under § 548(c). Nevertheless, the Ninth
Circuit held to the contrary in AFI Holding.
Professor Schechter warns that this "decision will make it much more
difficult for bankruptcy trustees to recover distributions made to the
'early investors' in Ponzi schemes, thus prejudicing the rights of the later
'investors."'2 7 While case law exists buoying the court's decision in AFI
Holding,"8 interpreting a partnership interest as a creditor interest seems to
turn on its head the purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 548, the equitable distribution
of funds to defrauded creditors.
The result in AFIHolding poses a perplexing question: Is this decision an
anomaly applicable only when Ponzi schemes intersect with partnerships?
Or are the interests of creditors in danger from this new debt-redeeming
equity interest? Although the answer may be strictly limited to fraudulent
partnerships, the Ninth Circuit appears to have extended the rights of a
creditor to an equity participant in a partnership as a matter of fairness
to defrauded investors. Proponents of AFI Holding might view the issue
23 Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F3d 700, 702 (9th Cir. 2008).
24 See id. at 708. The court and both sides in the case agreed that the partnerships had
received the transfers in good faith, thereby satisfying the second requirement of the good
faith defense. Id.
25 5 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 548.05[I1[b] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
15th ed. rev. 2009).
26 Schechter, supra note 14.
27 Id.
28 See Sender v. Hannahs (In rr Hedged Invs. Assocs., Inc.), 176 B.R. 214 (D. Colo.
1994) (finding that limited partnership interests are entitled to the good faith defense under
§ 548(c)); Sender v. Simon, 174 B.R. 6o1, 603 (D. Colo. 1994).
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not as creditors' rights versus equity participants' rights, but instead as
whether a release of a legal claim against the Ponzi scheme can constitute
sufficient value to satisfy the good faith defense. z9 Others could defend the
decision on the basis that defrauded investors are due an equitable remedy
in a Ponzi scheme's extreme circumstances. Yet both rationales ignore the
broader implications of this decision: if the claims of a limited partner can
be converted into creditor claims, could other types of equity interests
also be converted? This possible implication is a legitimate concern of
Professor Schechter and other bankruptcy legal scholars.
Victims of Ponzi schemes need to be protected and afforded sufficient
remedies under the law, yet the current fraudulent transfer statutes do not
provide proper remedies for victims asserting the good faith defense where
investors possess equity securities. Investors in AFI Holding and similar
circumstances should be afforded all statutory defenses; however, that right
cannot come at the expense of ignoring the explicit statutory definition of
"equity security" in the Bankruptcy Code. Disregarding a definition this
clear is not the practice of any court.
This Note first examines the intricacies of Ponzi schemes and the
applicable fraudulent transfer law that governs the actions of a bankruptcy
trustee's pursuit of investor funds. It then discusses AFI Holding in greater
detail and, finally, examines the rationale, implications, and problems the
decision poses for the bankruptcy process and fraudulent transfer law.
I. PONZI SCHEMES
Charles Ponzi has the dubious honor of having his name attached to
the fraudulent investment scheme he is credited with inventing.30 A Ponzi
scheme is
an investment scheme which is not really supported by
any underlying business venture. The investors are paid
profits from the principal sums paid in by newly attracted
investors. Usually those who invest in the scheme are
promised large returns on their principal investments.
The initial investors are indeed paid the sizable promised
returns. This attracts additional investors. More and more
investors need to be attracted into the scheme so that the
growing number of investors on top can get paid. The
29 See i i U.S.C. § 548(c) (2006) (describing the good faith defense).
30 JAMES WALSH, YOU CAN'T CHEAT AN HONEST MAN 1 (1998). An Italian immigrant living
in Boston, Ponzi touted an investment scheme that exchanged foreign postage coupons for
American stamps. This exchange would supposedly yield several cents per transaction; how-
ever, Ponzi promised his investors returns of ioo% or more. Within ten months, the scheme
had collapsed with $Io million lost from close to zo,ooo investors. Id. at 1-5.
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person who runs this scheme typically uses some of the
money invested for personal use. Usually, this pyramid
collapses and most investors not only do not get paid their
profits, but also lose their principal investments."
Upon the collapse of an unsuccessful scheme and the filing of a petition,
the bankruptcy process commences and the stewardship of a bankruptcy
trustee begins.3" A bankruptcy trustee is charged with collecting the
remaining assets of the Ponzi scheme to pay the claims arrayed against
it.33 Generally, though, the trustee finds himself dealing with "very few
physical or liquid assets." 34
Trustees are frequently left with little else than claims against investors
who withdrew their money from the scheme before its collapse.35 At times,
bankruptcy trustees have been able to bring actions against the spouses or
families of the individuals instigating the fraud.36 Nevertheless, the most
important assets for the trustee "are the claims that the [bankrupt] estate
has against those investors who received 'returns' on their investments."37
These claims are pursued by the bankruptcy trustee through the fraudulent
transfer laws in the Bankruptcy Code.3
II. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAWS
Fraudulent transfer laws have their origin in the Statute of 13 Elizabeth
I (1570). 9 Today "[tlhere are three main sources of fraudulent transfer law:
(1) § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, (2) the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act (UFCA), and (3) the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA)." '
Although actions under fraudulent transfer statutes may incite feelings
to the contrary, it is assumed that the fraudulent transfer provision of the
Bankruptcy Code "is not a punitive provision designed to punish the
transferee, but is instead an equitable provision that places the transferee in
the same position as other similarly situated creditors who did not receive
31 McDermott, supra note 6, at 158.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 E3d 750, 758 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. ioz8
(1995).
37 McDermott, supra note 6, at 158.
38 Id.
39 Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners-A (In reAgric. Research & Tech. Group, Inc.), 916
E2d 528, 534 (9th Cit. 199o).
40 McDermott, supra note 6, at 159 (citations omitted).
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fraudulent [transfers]." 41
Under the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy trustees utilize two specific
statutes to recover the transfers after the collapse of a Ponzi scheme: § 547
and § 548.41 Section 547, however, is not considered under the umbrella
of the fraudulent transfer statutes. While related in function to other
fraudulent transfer provisions, § 547 is referred to as the "Preferential
Transfer Law. ' 43 As § 547 preference actions are not subject to the good
faith defense in § 548(c), their effect and scope are not relevant to this
Note.44
State fraudulent transfer statutes parallel § 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code.45 State statutes are frequently used by federal courts in fraudulent
transfer cases, as § 544(b) and § 550 allow a trustee to adjudicate and collect
claims in federal court under the appropriate state fraudulent transfer
provisions.46 While there are numerous reasons to use state statutes over
federal statutes, a significant reason is the different statutes of limitations:
the federal fraudulent transfer statute limits a trustee's recapture to transfers
made within the past two years,47 while some states allow a trustee to reach
back further in time.48
41 Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners (In re Bayou Group,
LLC), 396 B.R. 81o, 827 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2oo8).
42 See i i U.S.C. § 547 (2oo6); i i U.S.C. § 548 (2006). The statutes use the word "avoid"
in the sense that a trustee attempts to "avoid" transfers to investors and recoup the amount
of the transfers.
43 I1 U.S.C. § 547; McDermott, supra note 6, at I81-82.
44 II U.S.C. § 547. No mention of the defense is found in I I U.S.C. § 547. Id. An ad-
vantage to using § 547 over § 548 is that "it allows the trustee to recover the return of an
investor's principal, even though the investor made the investment in both subjective and
objective good faith." McDermott, supra note 6, at 181. However, because § 547 is limited
to only ninety days before the debtor seeks bankruptcy protection, it is seldom applicable
in bankruptcy cases involving Ponzi schemes. See i i U.S.C. § 547. This is because investors
who have been wiped out by the Ponzi scheme must attack the transfers to investors who
withdrew their principal and profits years before the collapse of the scheme. See Barclay v.
Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d 700, 703 (9th Cir. 2oo8) ("Our concern here is
not the law of preferences under i i U.S.C. § 547, because we are years removed from that
section's ninety-day reach back period."); Kim et al., supra note 5.
45 See Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1004 (2003); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.05 (West I997); CAL.
CiV. CODE § 3439.04 (West 1997 & Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-8-105 (20O8); HAw. REV.
STAT. § 651C-4 (1993).
46 II U.S.C. § 544(b) (zoo6); i i U.S.C. § 550 (2oo6); see also Hayes v. Palm Seedlings
Partners-A (In reAgric. Research & Tech. Group, Inc.), 916 F2d 528,534 (9th Cit. 1990); Wyle
v. Rider (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589,593 (9th Cir. 1991); McDermott, supra note
6, at i59--6o ("Almost all states have enacted either the [Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act] or the [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act], and there are few substantive distinctions
between the two uniform statutes, or between the two statutes and § 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code.").
47 ii U.S.C. § 548(a)(i) (2oo6).
48 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3439.04. California fraudulent conveyance law does not have a
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A. Recovery under 11 U.S.C. § 548: Fraudulent Transfers and Obligations
Pursuant to § 548, a bankruptcy trustee may recapture transfers under
"two distinct theories of recovery ... in a case against a Ponzi-scheme
investor: constructive fraud and actual fraud."49 The two theories differ
in elements and requirements of proof; however, the most important
distinction between the two is their treatment of the bankruptcy trustee's
recovery of fictitious profits versus the recovery of an investor's investment
principal. The difference between the "profits" investors receive from the
Ponzi scheme and the return of their principal investment is an important
distinction in understanding § 548. Investors are never able to keep the
profits distributed by the Ponzi scheme. 0 The general rationale for this
rule is that a Ponzi scheme, being fraudulent in nature, never actually turns
a profit that can be distributed to investors. Therefore, when an investor
withdraws his investment from a Ponzi scheme before its collapse, the
"profits" that are credited to the investor are nonexistent, as they arise not
from an underlying business venture but instead from outright theft. To
use a common maxim, if a Ponzi scheme robs Peter to pay Paul, Paul is not
entitled to his misbegotten profits.
This rule for fictitious profits does not apply to the return of an
investor's principal investment. Whether an investor is entitled to his initial
investment withdrawn before the collapse of a Ponzi scheme is an often-
litigated matter over which trustees and investor-defendants frequently
battle." Thus, while an investor is never entitled to the fictitious profits
he withdraws from a Ponzi scheme, he may be able to keep his initial
investment, depending on the circumstances.
1. Constructive Fraud and Fraudulent Transfer Law.- The constructive
and actual fraud theories under § 548 share one common element: the
Ponzi-scheme operator must maintain an interest in the investors' funds."
Constructive fraud requires the bankruptcy trustee to show two additional
elements to collect a transfer from an investor: 1) that the debtor (the
defunct Ponzi scheme) "received less than a reasonably equivalent value
in exchange for such transfer or obligation"53 and 2) that the debtor
I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made
temporal limitation. 1d; see also In re AFI Holding, Inc., 525 F3d at 703.
49 McDermott, supra note 6, at 16o.
50 See Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F3d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1028
(1995); Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843,857 (D. Utah 1987).
51 See Scholes, 56 E3d at 757; Merill, 77 B.R. at 857.
52 ii U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2oo6); see McDermott, supra note 6, at i6o.
53 ii U.S.C. § 548(a)(i)(B)(i) (zoo6).
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or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a
result of such transfer or obligation;
II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about
to engage in business or a transaction, for which any
property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably
small capital;
III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would
incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to
pay as such debts matured; or
IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or
incurred such obligation to or for the benefit of an insider,
under an employment contract and not in the ordinary
course of business.54
The first element, the requirement that the Ponzi-scheme operator
maintain an interest in investor funds, is rarely litigated. In some cases,
investor-defendants "have asserted that the property they received from
the debtor did not actually constitute property in which the debtor had an
interest.""5 The argument stems from the notion that the perpetrator of
a Ponzi scheme acquires the funds used to run his scheme through fraud
and therefore cannot claim legitimate title to the property.5 6 To accept this
defense, a court must determine that the funds held by a Ponzi scheme
were in a "constructive trust" in which the Ponzi-scheme operator had
no property rights.57 The principal flaw of the constructive trust theory is
that an investor-defendant is required to show that the money redeemed
from the debtor-Ponzi scheme constitutes the exact funds as the initial
investment.5 8 With most Ponzi scheme cases, funds from investors are
commingled so that tracing a particular investment from a specific investor
is impossible. Thus, "Ponzi-scheme defendants therefore will nearly
always be unable to establish that the funds they received are not property
in which the debtor had an interest."5 9
The next element (though this element is outlined as the third
requirement in the first paragraph of this section) of constructive fraud
revolves around the reduction in value of the assets held by the Ponzi
scheme as compared to the liabilities of the scheme. Generally, this
element requires proof that transferring funds from the Ponzi scheme
54 Id. § 548(a)()(B)(ii).
55 McDermott, supra note 6, at 16i.
56 Jobin v. Youth Benefits Unlimited, Inc. (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 59 F3d 1078,
io8i (ioth Cir. 1995).
57 See Berger, Shapiro & Davis, P.A. v. Haeling (In re Foos), I83 B.R. 149, 154 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. I995).
58 McDermott, supra note 6, at 163.
59 Id. at 164.
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would leave it insolvent. Transfers that render an entity insolvent are
deemed to be fraudulent,' and, as most Ponzi schemes are by their very
nature insolvent (the liabilities to their investors always outpace their
assets), transfers from a Ponzi scheme typically satisfy this element. This
element, however, can be difficult to demonstrate if a Ponzi scheme started
as a legitimate investment business. Here, the actual date of insolvency
must be determined by forensic accountants, 61 as insolvency must be
shown for each transfer the trustee wants to invalidate and collect.6 Some
jurisdictions have alleviated this problem by creating the assumption that
if a Ponzi scheme is shown to exist, then it is deemed to be insolvent from
its beginning.63 Nevertheless, the actual existence of a Ponzi scheme must
be shown either through guilty pleas of the conspirators or through forensic
accounting."
The last element of constructive fraud requires that the debtor
"received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation." 6 "[Vialue" is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as
"property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the
debtor, but does not include an unperformed promise to furnish support
to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor.'' 66 When analyzing a transfer
from the debtor-Ponzi scheme, the court focuses on what the debtor has
received from the investor in exchange for the transfer to that investor.
If, in transferring funds to an investor, the debtor-Ponzi scheme failed to
receive consideration that was "reasonably equivalent" in value, then the
transfer will be deemed fraudulent and void. 67
Courts, when examining this element, clearly delineate between what
exactly is being transferred from the debtor-Ponzi scheme to investors:
return of investment principal or fictitious profits.'M Courts are uniform
60 i i U.S.C. § 548(a)(i)(B)(ii)(I) (zoo6).
61 Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners (In re Bayou Group,
LLC), 396 B.R. 81o, 835-42 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008). A comprehensive financial analysis was
performed by a forensic accountant to determine when the Bayou Fund became insolvent.
Id.
62 § 548(a)(1(B)(ii)(I).
63 See Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 871 (D. Utah
1987).
64 Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. zoo8)
("Here, [the Ponzi scheme perpetrator's] plea demonstrates the existence of fraudulent intent
and a Ponzi scheme .... "); see In re Bayou Group, LLC, 396 B.R. at 843. The court uses guilty
pleas and forensic accounting to show the existence of a Ponzi scheme. Id.
65 i1 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2oo6).
66 Id. § 548(d)(Z)(A).
67 Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 E3d 750, 756 (7 th Cir. 1995), Cert. denied, 516 U.S. io28 (1995).
See § 548(a)(I)(B)(i).
68 SeeScholes, 56 E3 d at 757; Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners-A (In reAgric. Research &
Tech. Group, Inc.), 916 F.2d 528, 539 (9 th Cir 199o); McDermott, supra note 6, at 164-65.
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in allowing trustees to recoup the fictitious profits paid out to investors,
determining that the debtor-Ponzi schemes have not received reasonably
equivalent value for these transfers.69  Acting to the contrary would
"incorrectly [assume] that there is something of value in a Ponzi scheme
when in fact the whole series of transactions has been a sham."70
The return of principal to investors is viewed differently. Courts accept
that the aggrieved investors have a tort claim for restitution against the
debtor-Ponzi scheme in the amount of their principal investment.7 1 Some
jurisdictions have liberally applied a rule that all transfers from the debtor-
Ponzi scheme to investors should first pay down the existing restitution
claims for the return of investors' principal investments, regardless of the
characterization of the transfers. Thus, every payment by the debtor-
Ponzi scheme to investors prior to bankruptcy, whether termed profits or
return of capital, would be applied to an investor's principal investment and
subsequently reduce the restitution claim. Other jurisdictions, however,
have ignored such attempts, determining that "a Ponzi investor [is] not
entitled to set off payments received in excess of an initial investment
against losses incurred in subsequent related investments because the
claims [arise] out of [an] independent [transaction]."73  Despite this
jurisdictional split, all courts agree on one point: a bankruptcy trustee
bringing an action under the constructive fraud statutes is limited to the
recoupment of fictitious profits that are paid above the investor's initial
investment.
2. Actual Fraud and Fraudulent Transfer Law.- Besides the initial element
shared by constructive and actual fraud under § 548,14 actual fraud has only
one more requirement: the debtor must make the "transfer or [incur] such
obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which
the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made
or such obligation was incurred, indebted."75 Actual fraud differs from
constructive fraud, as there must be actual intent on the part of the debtor
to "hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors.7 6 Additionally, a bankruptcy trustee
69 Scholes, 56 F3d at 757; Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family (In re United Energy Corp.), 944
E2d 589, 595 n.6 (9th Cir. 199i); Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners
(In re Bayou Group, LLC), 396 B.R. 8Io, 831 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2oo8).
70 McDermott, supra note 6, at I68.
71 See In reBayou Group, LLC, 396 B.R. at 831 n.6; McDermott, supra note 6, at 165-66.
72 Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 853 n.14 (D. Utah
1987).
73 McDermott, supra note 6, at 169 n.49.
74 iI U.S.C. § 548(a)() (2oo6); see McDermott, supra note 6, at i6o.
75 I1 U.S.C. § 548(a)(i)(A) (2oo6).
76 Id.; see also Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1028
('995).
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does not have to show that the debtor-Ponzi scheme received "less than
a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for [a] transfer or obligation"77
because under actual fraud, transfers are "deemed fraudulent even if [they
are] in exchange for 'valuable' consideration."'7 8  The most substantial
difference between the two recovery theories is that while recovery under
constructive fraud allows for the collection of fictitious profits only, actual
fraud allows a bankruptcy trustee to recover both fictitious profits and an
investor-defendant's principal investment.7 9
Proving the additional element of actual fraud can be simple when a
court has determined that the debtor is a bankrupt Ponzi scheme. A number
of jurisdictions hold that the mere presence of a Ponzi scheme is sufficient
to show that there was "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors
under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a).' ' 80 Other courts have found the fraudulent intent
element of actual fraud on lesser proof.8 Yet, bankruptcy trustees continue
to primarily rely on forensic accounting and guilty pleas to demonstrate the
existence of a Ponzi scheme. 82
The final advantage of showing actual fraud under § 548 is that once
the trustee has demonstrated that the transfers were made with "actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud""' creditors, all past transfers made by
the debtor-Ponzi scheme are deemed fraudulent and may be avoided
by the trustee.84 Unless the redeeming investor asserts a defense in the
bankruptcy trustee's suit, the fictitious profits and the initial investment
must be returned to the bankrupt estate.
77 1I U.S.C. § 548(a)(I)(B)(i) (2oo6).
78 Scholes, 56 E3d at 757.
79 McDermott, supra note 6, at 173.
8o Johnson v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 525 F3d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 2008); see Hayes v. Palm
Seedlings Partners-A (In re Agric. Research & Tech. Group, Inc.), 916 E2d 528, 534-35 (9th
Cit. i99o); Conroy v. Shott, 363 E2d 90, 92 (6th Cit. 1966), cert. denied, 393 U.S. ioi8 (1969).
8i See Coleman Am. Moving Servs., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In reAm. Props.,
Inc.), 14 B.R. 637, 643 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (where the court did not require "overt intent"
in its application of § 548(a)(I)).
82 See Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d 700, 702 (9th Cit. zoo8).
The guilty plea of a Ponzi scheme perpetrator demonstrates the existence of a Ponzi scheme.
Id.;Johnson, 525 E3d at 81o. The court used guilty pleas and forensic accounting to show the
existence of a Ponzi scheme. Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners (In
re Bayou Group, LLC), 396 B.R. 81o, 843 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. zoo8).
83 i1 U.S.C. § 548(a)(I)(A) (zoo6).
84 See Hayes, 916 F.2d at 531; In r Bayou Group, LLC, 396 B.R. at 843. The court in Hayes
notes the district court's decision to void all transfers from the debtor-Ponzi scheme when
actual fraud was shown. Hayes, 916 F.2d at 531. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upholds
the lower court's decision. Id. The court in In re Bayou Group, LLC also concluded that upon an
adequate showing of actual fraud under § 548, the plaintiff-bankruptcy trustee was entitled to
the full amount of redemption payments from all defendants, subject to affirmative defenses.
In re Bayou Group, LLC, 396 B.R. at 843.
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B. The Good Faith Defense to Constructive and Actual Fraud
When a bankruptcy trustee seeks to recover fraudulent transfers,
investor-defendants are left with one primary defense: the good faith
defense. If a prima facie case for actual or constructive fraud is made by
a bankruptcy trustee, the burden is thrust upon the investor-defendant
"to establish [his] affirmative defense under [§J 548(c). '85 Under the good
faith defense
[an investor-defendant] may retain the transfer (the
redemption payment) if both of two conditions are met:
(i) if the [investor-defendant] "takes for value . . ." but
only "to the extent that such [investor-defendant] ...
gave value to the [debtor-Ponzi scheme] in exchange for
such transfer;" and (ii) if the [investor-defendant] "takes
... in good faith."86
If the investor can set forth both elements, then the bankruptcy trustee
must transfer the investment principal to the investor. Without both
elements, the good faith defense necessarily fails.
1. Taking in Good Faith.- Good faith under § 548(c) is an objective good
faith standard under which the investor-defendant has the burden of
proof.87 The court must determine whether an investor redeemed an
investment in a Ponzi scheme because the investor subjectively knew or
was aware of enough facts to be put on "inquiry notice" that the debtor was
operating a Ponzi scheme.88 If either is true, then "the investor fails to carry
his burden of proving that he accepted sums from the debtor in good faith,
and the trustee is entitled to recover all amounts the investor received from
the debtor."8 9
The good faith defense cannot be satisfied if the investor-defendant had
actual knowledge of the fraud; however, a bankruptcy trustee is generally
in a situation where the investor was on "inquiry notice."' 9 Courts have
considered a variety of factors 9' in determining whether an investor should
85 In re Bayou Group, LLC, 396 B.R. at 844.
86 Id.; see also i i U.S.C. § 548(c) (2oo6); Stephen P. Harbeck & Karen A. Caplan, Work For
a Ponzi Scheme-andKeep Your Commissions, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRc. 3 (2004).
87 Hayes, 916 F.zd at 535-36; McDermott, supra note 6, at 176-77.
88 McDermott, supra note 6, at 176-77.
89 Id. at 177.
90 Id. at 176-78.
91 Id. at 178-79. Courts have considered, among other factors, the following: (i) "the
investor's level of business knowledge," (2) "the disparity between prevailing market rates of
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
have been "objectively 'on alert that there was a potential problem with
the [investment scheme]."' 9 If these factors give rise to inquiry notice,
then "[iun order to prove 'good faith,' [a] 'diligent investigation"' by the
investor who received the transfer "must ameliorate the issues that placed
the transferee on inquiry notice in the first place."93 If the court determines
that the investigation is inadequate, then the good faith defense will fail.'
2. Taking for Value under the Good Faith Defense.- The second prong of
§ 548(c) mandates that a "transferee or obligee" may only successfully
assert the good faith defense to the extent that value is given for the
transfer. 9 Thus, a court focuses on whether the debtor-Ponzi scheme
received something of value in exchange for the distribution to investors. 96
The requirement for giving "reasonably equivalent value" is found only
in the constructive fraud elements and not within the statutory language
of the good faith defense.97 Though there is debate among some, "giving
value" under the good faith defense and "giving reasonably equivalent
return and the rates of return promised by the debtor," (3) "how the investor learned of the
debtor's investment scheme," and (4) "the type of due diligence investigation the investor
made of the debtor's investment scheme." Id.
92 Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners (In re Bayou Group,
LLC), 396 B.R. 81o, 845 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2oo8) (quoting Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd (In
re Manhattan Inv. Fund, Ltd.), 397 B.R. i, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
93 Id. at 846 (quoting Jobin v. McKay (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 84 E3 d 1330, 1335-
36 (ioth Cir. 1996)).
94 Id. at 846-47. Courts have also determined that "taking no steps at all would [amount]
to 'willful ignorance,' which would [defeat] the good faith defense." Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp.,
397 B.R. at i9 n.39 (quoting Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund
Ltd.), 359 B.R. 510,525 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
Some courts have recognized an exception to "inquiry notice." Under this exception,
the good faith defense would not fail even if an investor-defendant withdrew funds from
a Ponzi scheme-investment while on inquiry notice. As laid out by Judge Adlai Hardin, an
investor-defendant could
establish his [good faith] defense if he [could] prove by a preponderance
of the credible objective evidence that his request ... was in fact the result
of a good faith reason other than his knowledge of "red flags," even if he
was on inquiry notice and did not make inquiry before redeeming.
In re Bayou Group, LLC, 396 B.R. at 848-49. However, this exception is difficult for an inves-
tor-defendant to demonstrate, as it requires a specific reason for redemption. See id. at 854-56.
The good faith defense was upheld where an investor-defendant redeemed its investment
because the original investment had been a part of a particular swap transaction and the in-
vestor's exposure to the swap risk was terminated. Id. This was determined to be a satisfactory
reason to redeem funds invested even while on inquiry notice that the investment scheme
may have been fraudulent. Id. This exception, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
95 See i i U.S.C. § 548(c) (2006).
96 Barclay v. Mackenzie (In reAFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F3d 700, 707 (9th Cir. zoo8).
97 Compare i i U.S.C. § 548(a)(I)(B)(i) (2oo6), with i i U.S.C. § 548(c).
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value" under constructive fraud are similar, if not identical, elements.98
Regardless, without value being given, the good faith defense will fail and
the transfer will be voided.
As stated earlier, "value" is set forth in § 548 as "property, or satisfaction
or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor."99 The question
of whether value has been given turns on what the debtor-Ponzi scheme
received in return for the transfer to the investor-defendant. Where an
investment fund is determined to be a Ponzi scheme, such as the fraud
perpetrated by Mr. Madoff, courts typically find that transfers from the
debtor-Ponzi scheme to investor-defendants constitute value.' °0 The
presence of fraud entitles the investor-defendant to a tort claim of restitution
against the debtor-Ponzi scheme, but payments by the debtor-Ponzi
scheme to the investor reduce this restitution claim, with any transfers over
the initial investment deemed to be fictitious profits and thereby returned
to the trustee. These restitution claims arise from the already-existing
creditor relationship the investors enjoy with an investment fund.
While a typical investor's monetary interest in a Ponzi scheme gives rise
to a general creditor relationship, a limited partner in a failed Ponzi scheme
partnership is not afforded such a status. A limited partner's right to collect
property from a failed Ponzi scheme partnership is viewed as secondary to
the collection rights of general creditors. This subordination occurs because
a partnership interest held by an investor, whether a general partnership
interest or a limited partnership interest, is merely an equity interest. 0'
Equity interests also include the ownership interests of stockholders. 0
Courts adhere to the rule that "less than reasonably equivalent value is
received when a company redeems the equity interests of its principal." ' 3
As the redemption of an equity interest does not constitute value, and
98 In re AFI Holding, Inc., 525 F3d at 707 ("We find no reason, in statute or case law, to
treat 'reasonably equivalent value' differently for each of the Code's provisions. Both the pri-
ma facie case for constructively fraudulent transfers under [§ 548(a)(i)(A)], and the affirmative
defense to actually fraudulent transfers under [§ 548(c)] require the determination of whether
,reasonably equivalent value' was transferred from the transferee to the debtor.").
99 11 U.S.C. § 54 8(d)(2)(A) (2oo6).
ioo Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners (In re Bayou Group,
LLC), 396 B.R. 81o, 844 (9th Cir. 2oo8).
loi i i U.S.C. § io1(i6)(B) (20o6). The definition of "equity security" includes the "in-
terest of a limited partner in a limited partnership." Id.
102 Id. § ioi(I6)(A).
103 Tomsic v. Pitocchelli (In ,r Tri-Star Techs. Co.), 26o B.R. 319, 326 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2001); see, e.g., Murphy v. Robinson (In re Ipswich Bituminous Concrete Prods., Inc.), 79 B.R.
511, 516-I7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); Buncher Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of
GenFarm Ltd. P'ship IV, 229 E3d 245, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2o00); Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v.
Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc.), ioo B.R. 127, 136 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); Consove
v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 701 E2d 978,982 (Ist Cir. 1983); Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 E2d
756, 757 (5th Cir. 1935).
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value is a requirement to avoid a constructively fraudulent transfer' °4 and
to assert the good faith defense in an actual fraudulent transfer,05 the
equity interest-holders must await the redemption of creditors before
taking under the bankruptcy laws. In California, the state in which AFI
Holding was decided, it is plainly stated that "[a] limited partner shall not
receive from a general partner or out of partnership property any part of his
contribution until ... [aIll liabilities of the partnership ... have been paid or
there remains property of the partnership sufficient to pay them.'
''°6
Notwithstanding this statutory language, AFI Holding held that
exchanging an equity-partnership interest for an equivalent restitution
claim could give sufficient value to satisfy the good faith defense under
§ 548(c). How was the Ninth Circuit able to reconcile this decision with past
precedent and the Bankruptcy Code, which have stated to the contrary?
III. BACKGROUND OF AFIHOLDING
On October 22, 2001, Advance Finance, Inc., AFI Holding, Inc., and
a number of partnerships, all controlled by Gary A. Eisenberg, filed for
bankruptcy protection in Los Angeles, California."°7 This marked the
collapse of a fraudulent investment scheme that had been operating since
1994.108 Attracting investors by promising them 9% to 18% returns per
year, Mr. Eisenberg sold limited partnerships to investors with a minimum
investment of $50,000.'° Ostensibly, investors' funds were to be used as
collateral against which small- to medium-sized companies could borrow
(the money would be held in accounts known as "factoring accounts").,n
About 200 investors nationwide, many of them the friends and family of
Mr. Eisenberg, invested approximately $21 million in the scheme.'
As early as 1996, several of Mr. Eisenberg's partnerships had loaned
investor money to questionable businesses resulting in several defaults on
payments due to the AFI partnerships.12 Furthermore, AFI employees had
approved loan agreements with risky businesses in return for kickbacks."3
Despite these setbacks and the knowledge that his investment scheme
104 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2oo6).
io5 Id. § 548(c).
io6 CAL. CORP. CODE § 15516(1)(a) (West zoo6).
107 Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, SEC v. Eisenberg, No.
02-6479 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2002), available at http://www.sec.govlitigationlcomplaints/
comp17691.htm.
io8 Id.
io9 Id.
uio Id.
iii Id.
1l2 Id.
113 Id.
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was operating at a significant loss, Mr. Eisenberg deceived investors by
describing the partnerships as financially successful) 14 Between 1994 and
2001, at least $9.8 million of new investor money was used to pay investors
their promised returns and to cash out other investors (the trademark of
a Ponzi scheme)."5 Following the bankruptcy filing, Mr. Eisenberg pled
guilty to federal securities and mail fraud charges.1 16 In his plea agreement,
he admitted to operating a Ponzi scheme."'
After establishing claims against Mr. Eisenberg, the bankruptcy trustee
brought lawsuits against AFI investors who had received distributions
prior to the scheme's collapse." 8 Keith Mackenzie, having withdrawn his
principal investment and fictitious profits before the bankruptcy filing,
was one of the 170 investors targeted by the bankruptcy trustee, and he
became the principal litigant in AFI Holding."9 The trustee sought to
recover the transfers pursuant to the fraudulent transfer laws of California,
which mirror § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.' The lower bankruptcy court
granted summary judgment in favor of the trustee, voiding the transfers
made by the AFI partnerships to Mr. Mackenzie.' On appeal, the district
court overturned the judgment in part.' It reasoned "that Mackenzie had
exchanged his purported partnership interest for a proportionately reduced
restitution claim," thereby transforming the "equity interest [of] a limited
partner" to the claim of a creditor. 1 3 The district court then remanded the
case to the bankruptcy court to determine if Mr. Mackenzie had received
the transfer in good faith.' 4 The bankruptcy trustee appealed this decision
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 5
IV. EXCHANGING PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS FOR RESTITUTION CLAIMS
A. Analysis of the Ninth Circuit in AFI Holding
The focus of the argument in the district court was the same at the
court of appeals level: whether a limited partnership interest (an equity
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Barclay v. Mackenzie (In reAFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F3d 700, 702 (9th Cir. 20o8).
H7 Id.
i18 Id.
II9 Id.
120 Id. (actions brought under ii U.S.C. § 544(b) and § 550, using the California statutes,
CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3439.04, .o8 (West 1997 & Supp. 2009)).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
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security interest) would preclude an investor-defendant from raising the
good faith defense in § 548(c) because it did not constitute value.2 6 The
bankruptcy trustee and Mr. Mackenzie seized upon two cases that had been
decided earlier by the Ninth Circuit: In re UnitedEnegy Corp."2 7 (hereinafter
United Energy) and In re Agricultural Research and Technology Group, Inc.18
(hereinafter Agretech).'2 9 The bankruptcy trustee likened Agretech to
the facts of AFI Holding, as the court in Agretech voided transfers from a
partnership to a group of limited partners because, under the applicable
state law, the "taking for value" requirement 30 could not be met where the
transfer was to satisfy limited partnership interests. 3' The Agretech court
determined that "limited partnership interests [were] classified as 'equity
[securities].""3  For the investor-defendants, Mr. Mackenzie analogized
AFI Holding to United Enegy, where the Ninth Circuit upheld an investor's
right to rescind a contract propagated by a Ponzi scheme.' 33 According to
the court, this right to restitution "could be exchanged on a dollar-for-
dollar basis for payments received under the investors' contracts with [the
debtor-Ponzi scheme]."'T ' Thus, investors could keep the amount they
received before the bankruptcy filing to offset the rescission claim each
investor had in the sum of their principal investment.
From this preliminary description, the Agretech facts seem more akin to
the matter confronted by the court in AFI Holding. Agretech dealt specifically
with partnership interests and whether they were to be treated as equity
securities. 1' 3 The court in Agretech used the definition of "equity security"
in the Bankruptcy Code to demonstrate that a limited partnership is an
equity security rather than a creditor interest.3 6 In doing so, the Ninth
Circuit aligned itself with at least one other circuit. 37 Furthermore, while
126 Id. at 704, 706. Other issues were decided by the court, such as whether Mackenzie
was entitled to the fictitious profits. Id. at 703-04. Discussions of these side issues are beyond
the scope of this Note.
127 Wyle v. Rider (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 Ed 589 (9th Cir. 199i).
I28 Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners-A (In reAgric. Research & Tech. Group, Inc.), 916
E2d 528 (9th Cir. 199o).
129 Barclay v. Mackenzie (In reAFI Holding, Inc.), 525 E3d 700, 704-09 (9th Cir. zoo8).
130 11 U.S.C. § 548(c), (d)(z)(A) (2oo6).
131 In reAFI Holding, Inc., 525 F.3d at 705 (citing Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners-A (In
reAgric. Research & Tech. Group, Inc.), 916 F2d 528, 540 (9th Cir. 199o)).
132 Hayes, 916 Ed at 540 (citing si U.S.C. § 1oi( 5 ) (which has since been changed to
iI U.S.C. § l1(16))).
133 Wyle v. Rider (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 Fad 589, 591 (9th Cir. 1991).
134 Id.
135 Hayes, 916 Ead at 540.
136 Id. at 54o (citing I i U.S.C. § ioI(I5) (which has since been changed to I I U.S.C. §
o 10(6))).
137 See Buncher Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of GenFarm Ltd. P'ship
IV, 229 E3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2ooo).
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United Energy touched upon the definition of "debt" and the apparent
congressional intent to expand its definition, the case did not directly
deal with partnership interests and their classification as an equity or debt
instrument.'38
Mr. Mackenzie's appellate brief sought to demonstrate that the United
Energy position was "consistent with the decisions of other courts across the
nation in the [P]onzi setting."' 39 The appellant pointed to three cases that
examined partnership interests in the context of Ponzi schemes: 4° Sender
v. Hannahs (In re Hedged Investments Associates, Inc.) [hereinafter Hedged
Investments] ,141 Sender v. Simon,14 and Drenis v. Haligiannis.'43  Although
these cases are similar to some degree, none confront the primary issue
of AFI Holding whether the exchange of an equity interest for a creditor's
restitution claim constitutes value under the good faith defense of
§ 548(c).
In Sender v. Simon, the court analyzed the rights of limited partners to
rescission and restitution against a partnership operated as a Ponzi scheme.144
The court ultimately determined that a partnership did not exist because it
was created under fraudulent pretenses. 4s As only a partnership planning
to operate in "lawful business" could be created under the partnership
statutes of Colorado, the court concluded that the common law provided
for restitution and rescission claims against the defunct partnership. 46
Without a partnership, the issues of equity securities and value did not
arise. The court in Drenis v. Haligiannis also provided limited partners with
a restitution claim against the partnership; 47 however, whether an equity
interest constituted value under the good faith defense was not decided by
the court. 14 The Hedged Investments court also did not confront the issue of
138 Wyle, 944 F.2d at 595-96. In this case, the court found that the Bankruptcy Code
"does not require that a 'debt' be a contractual liability." Id. at 595. Instead, the court point-
ed to the definition of "claim" in stating that a debt was "a liability on a 'right to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured."' Id. at
595-96 (quoting !i U.S.C. § 1oi(5)(A)). This definition helped the court to find that the
claims of rescission and restitution existed with or without a contractual right to the principal.
Id. at 596.
139 Appellee/Cross-Appellant Keith Mackenzie's Opening Brief at 26, Barclay v.
Mackenzie (In reAFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F3d 700 (9th Cir. 2oo8).
140 See id.
141 Sender v. Hannahs (In re Hedged Inv. Assocs.), 176 B.R. 214 (D. Colo. 1994).
142 Sender v. Simon, 174 B.R. 6oi (D. Colo. 1994).
143 Drenis v. Haligiannis, 452 F Supp. 2d 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2oo6).
144 Simon, 174 B.R. at 603.
145 Id. at 604.
146 Id. at 603-04.
147 Drenis, 452 E Supp. 2d at 428.
148 See id.
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whether converting a partnership interest into a creditor's claim constituted
value, 14 9 even though Mr. Mackenzie's brief insinuated that the good faith
defense was at work in the case.5 0 The appellant's bottom line was that,
while cases in other circuits had skirted the questions of Ponzi schemes and
fraudulent transfer law, none discussed the issue in AFI Holding directly.
Despite marked similarities with Agretech and the explicit statutory
definition classifying a partnership interest as an equity security, the court
in AFI Holding saw more persuasive similarities in United Enegy.151 The
court distinguished Agretech from AFI Holding by stating that it had only
examined the "equity interest" in the former case with regard to the
capital contributions made by the limited partners, instead of focusing on
the restitution rights of the partners. 5 The court also noted that Agretech
had been examined entirely from the "taking in good faith" prong of
§ 548(c); therefore, the Agretech court had not afforded the "taking for value"
requirement an appropriate analysis. 15 3 The most relevant distinction
between Agretech and AFI Holding for the court was that the limited partners
in AFI Holding were enticed into the investment through fraud. 5 4 The
court determined that this difference was significant enough to ignore the
language in Agretech that stated that a partnership interest was strictly an
equity security.'55
B. Effect of the Decision in AFI Holding
For the court in AFI Holding, transforming an equity security into an
interest with the rights of a creditor seemed to rest on the presence of
fraud in the creation of the partnership interest. The court noted that
"[a]lthough circumstances of the exchange were cloaked in terms of a
partnership interest, we delve beyond the 'form' to the 'substance' of the
transaction."' 56 The "substance over form" argument may be the only hook
the Ninth Circuit has to hang its hat on. As Professor Schechter simply states,
"An outstanding equity interest is not a 'debt."" 57 Because fraud victims
typically become tort creditors, fraud may be the only explanation for the
equity-to-creditor transformation: the investor-defendants could collect
149 See Sender v. Hannahs (In re Hedged Invs. Assocs., Inc.), 176 B.R. 214 (D. Colo.
1994).
15o See Appellee/Cross-Appellant Keith Mackenzie's Opening Brief, supra note 139, at
26.
151 Barclay v. Mackenzie (In reAFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F3d 700,708-09 (9th Cir. 2oo8).
152 Id. at 705.
153 Id. at 707-o8.
154 Id. at 708.
155 See id.
i56 Id.
157 Schechter, supra note 14.
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their redemptions on their partnerships not as equity payments but instead
as "fraud restitution payments."" 8 The problem with this rationale is that
with or without the presence of fraud, exchanging a partnership interest for
a restitution claim runs afoul of the explicit "giving value" requirement of
§ 548(c) 59 and the common law principle that the redemption of an equity
security does not constitute value.160
An explicit problem with the decision in AFI Holding is that the court
does not grapple with the practical effects of advancing limited partners'
interests to creditors' interests. Using a hypothetical situation illustrated
in Collier on Bankrupty, a "[lender] who has made a loan to [a financial
enterprise] to enable the latter to extricate himself from a financial morass
by paying off pressing obligations is entitled to be regarded as a [general
creditor]."' 6' Applying this example to AFI Holding, the investors holding
limited partnership interests would collect at the same priority level
as unsecured creditors who either loaned money or provided goods and
services to the scheme without receiving sufficient collateral. So long as
neither the investor nor the unsecured lender had knowledge or believed
that the enterprise was a fraud, 16 a court following the precedent in AFI
Holding would give them an equal claim to assets.
Laying out the clear ramifications of AFI Holding with this hypothetical
situation harkens the words of Professor Schechter that a creditor has a "'right'
to payment" while an equity participant in an enterprise only maintains a
"'hope' of payment."'' 63 The presence of the fraudulent deception in the
investment scheme, unfortunate as it is, does not alter the underlying rights
the lender and the investor believed they possessed upon injecting funds
into the enterprise. A creditor who gave money, goods, or services to an
investment scheme naturally assumes that his priority rights under the
Bankruptcy Code would trump those of an equity participant. Though
the advancement of equity participants in AFI Holding may alleviate the
negative impact of the fraudulent scheme, these parties knew that losing
their investment was a real possibility. The fact that their investment was
lost through fraud should indeed provide them with a remedy, but not one
I58 Id.
159 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (zoo6).
16o Tomsic v. Pitocchelli (In re Tri-Star Techs. Co.), z6o B.R. 319, 326 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2001). See, e.g., Murphy v. Robinson (In re Ipswich Bituminous Concrete Prods., Inc.), 79 B.R.
511, 517 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); Buncher Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of
GenFarm Ltd. P'ship IV, 229 F 3 d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2000); Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v.
Byrne (In reVadnais Lumber Supply, Inc.), Ioo B.R. 127, 136 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); Consove
v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 701 F2d 978,982 (st Cir. 1983); Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 E2d
756, 757 (5th Cir. 1935).
16l 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 25, at l 548.0712][C].
162 Id.
163 Schechter, supra note 14.
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that would give them the rights of a creditor who expected the return of
his capital. In the court's search for an equitable remedy for the limited
partners in AFI Holding, the reasonable expectations of unsecured creditors
have been undermined for the benefit of the equity participants.
The court in AFI Holding additionally runs the risk of graying the bright
lines set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. The definition set out in 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(16)(B) states that an interest in a limited partnership is an equity
security. 1 4 Equity securities do not give rise to a "debt or antecedent debt"
so as to be included under the definition of "value" in § 548. Although
decisions by various courts provide ammunition to those who would read
the term "debt" very broadly,165 there have been no cases construing the
term "equity security" so broadly. Furthermore, strict construction of the
Bankruptcy Code has been consistently employed by all levels of federal
courts. The Supreme Court has on multiple occasions interpreted the
Bankruptcy Code strictly"6 and embraced the "plain meaning" analysis
when construing certain statutes. 67
Despite the aforementioned precedent, the court in AFI Holding
invokes rather succinctly the policy of substance over form in drawing its
conclusion.' 68 Such a liberal interpretation of a statutory definition leaves
open the question of what other bright line rules are flexible in the context
of an investment fraud. Closely-held corporations may be the next frontier
with decisions like AFI Holding. As closely-held corporations share many
similarities with partnerships, 169 the Ninth Circuit's decision could be used
to convert the equity ownership rights of a closely-held corporation to
those rights of a creditor' 0
There may be alternative explanations for the decision in AFI Holding.
164 1I U.S.C. § IoI(I6)(B) (2006).
165 See FCC v. Nextwave Pers. Commc'ns, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 302 (2003). The Court
states that "luinder the Bankruptcy Code, 'debt' means 'liability on a claim,'... and 'claim,' in
turn, includes any 'right to payment,'.... [The Supreme Court has] said that '[cilaim' has 'the
broadest available definition."' Id.
166 Id. at 302 (stating that "where Congress has intended to provide regulatory excep-
tions to provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, it has done so clearly and expressly."). See also
Diana L. Hayes, Comment, Bankruptcy Law: An Exercise in Statutory Interpretation--Staying
True to the Broad Aim of the Code or Ignoring Plain Meaning and Purpose?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 697,
699 (2007) ("Historically, in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, the Court has considered the
equal distribution purpose of the statute to mandate strict construction.").
167 See Nancy Hailer, Comment, Cybergenics H: Precedent and Policy vs. Plain Meaning, 56
ME. L. REV. 365, 404 (2004).
I68 Barclay v. Mackenzie (In reAFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F3d 700, 708 (9th Cir. 2008).
169 See generally HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 694-97 (3d
ed. 1983). Closely-held corporations have even been known as "incorporated partnership[s]"
or "chartered partnership[s]." Id. at 694.
170 Shares of stock are defined as a form of equity security. II U.S.C. § ioi(i6)(A)
(2006).
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The advancement of equity interests in the case could be an anomaly
where the limitations of fraudulent transfer law have intersected with the
complexities of twenty-first century finance; however, the drafters of the
Bankruptcy Code were well aware that fraudulent transfers in the context
of partnerships needed special attention. Section 548(b) of the Code was
created specifically to avoid transfers "to a partner by a partnership that is
insolvent or will be thereby rendered insolvent."17' The drafters saw fit
to abrogate the requirements that (1) there be actual intent or knowledge
of insolvency by the partners at the time of the transfer and that (2) the
partnership receive in exchange for the transfer an item of reasonably
equivalent value. 7 ' This provision allows for avoidance of transfers from
the partnership by the trustee on the showing that "the partnership was
insolvent at the time of or as a result of the transfer."'7 3 This special
treatment of partnerships under the fraudulent transfer statutes can be
largely attributed to the accounting principles that govern how partnership
assets are calculated. 7 4
An in-depth understanding of § 548(b) is immaterial for the purposes of
this Note. What is of significance is that the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code
recognized that partnerships and transfers of their assets merited specific
and special attention. While using inaction to demonstrate legislative
intent admittedly has questionable value, that the drafters specifically
singled out partnership interests offers evidence that if the drafters meant
to treat partnership interests as creditor interests in specific instances,
such a notation would have been made. This is especially true given that
the definition of "equity security" explicitly includes limited partnership
interests."-'
Other sections of the Bankruptcy Code indicate that the drafters of
the Code did not intend equity claims to be transformed into creditors'
claims. Section 5 10(b) of the Bankruptcy Code "authorizes the bankruptcy
court, in ordering distribution of assets, to subordinate all or any part of any
claim to all or any part of another claim, regardless of the priority ranking of
either claim."' 7 6 The Code section arose from the concerns of bankruptcy
scholars Professors John J. Slain and Homer Kripke that bankruptcy
"claims for rescission of securities purchases" were being classified as
"general unsecured debts or ... as secured debts [which] undermined the
171 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 25, at I 548.08.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. Assets of a partnership include the assets of the individual partners. Therefore, a
transfer from the partnership to a partner would not render the partnership insolvent, but that
transfer may nevertheless harm creditors because of personal exemption rights of individual
property in bankruptcy. Id.
175 II U.S.C. § ioi(16) (zoo6).
176 11 U.S.C. § 51o(b) (2oo6); S. REp. No. 95-989, at 10 (1978).
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absolute priority rule" that equity claims were subordinate to the claims of
creditors.'77 Interestingly enough, Professors Slain and Kripke proposed
this rule because American courts were granting rescission claims to equity
participants (stockholders) "in the context of securities fraud."'78 Section
510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code ensures that creditors are reimbursed before
investors seeking rescission of their securities purchases, even if the claim
for rescission possessed by the investor in the context of securities fraud
gives the investor and the creditor the same level of priority.7 9
Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code demonstrates clear legislative
intent that rescission claims by equity participants in the context of
securities fraud should be subordinated to other creditors' claims. Such a
mandate indicates that the Ninth Circuit was incorrect in deciding that the
rescission claims of a defrauded investor were equal to the creditor claims
of a bankruptcy trustee. For Professors Slain and Kripke, subordinating
defrauded stockholders' rescission claims was grounded in the "inherent...
nature of the shareholder/creditor contract that the shareholder should bear
relatively greater risk of business failure."'8 The decision in AFI Holding
turns this fundamental tenet on its head, shifting some of the risk that
equity participants are ordinarily faced with to the creditors by changing
the typical absolute priority rules of the Bankruptcy Code.
Another explanation for the court's decision may be more benign
than its desire to rewrite the definition of "equity security." Courts have
frequently and consistently held that a "compromise of a dispute can
supply the element of consideration." 8 ' Decisions rendered after AFI
Holding that employed its logic and cited to it have not focused on the
equity/creditor aspect of the case, but instead on the rule that the "giving
value" element of the good faith defense in § 548(c) could be satisfied
where an "[investor-defendant] had received a release in exchange for a
valid restitution claim."'' 18  Therefore, the argument could be fostered that
AFI Holding was simply an affirmation that the reduction of an investor's
restitution claim against the partnership in exchange for return of the
investor's principal investment is "value" as defined under the good faith
177 Christopher W. Frost, Subordination of Securities Claims in Bankruptcy: What is the Scope
of Section 51o(b)?, 27 No. 2 BANKR. L. LE-rrER 1, i (Feb. 2007).
178 Id. See Oppenheimer v. Harriman Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of New York, 301 U.S. zo6
(1937).
179 See ii U.S.C. § 51o(b).
i8o Frost, supra note 177, at 3.
18I Schaps v. Just Enough Corp. (In re Pinto Trucking Serv., Inc.), 93 B.R. 379, 389
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
182 Indep. Trust Corp. v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. of New York, 577 E Supp. 2d 1023,
io44 (N.D. II1. 2oo8) (citing Barclay v. Mackenzie (In reAFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F3d 700,708
(9th Cir. 2008)). See also Jordan v. Kroneberger (In re Jordan), 392 B.R. 428, 44z-44 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 2oo8).
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defense.
"Cancelation of' or "the settlement of' a legal claim can indeed be
sufficient consideration to satisfy the "reasonably equivalent value"
requirement of § 548(a) and the "giving value" element of § 548(c). It
can be seen as similar to the cancelation of future indebtedness which
has been held to be "good and valuable consideration for a transfer."u
Nevertheless, the courts that have recently relied upon the precedent in
AFI Holding were confronted with legal claims against the debtor arising
not from partnership interests, but from other contractual relationships. 4
Furthermore, while the Ninth Circuit in AFI Holding could have seen
the issue as whether the release of a claim constituted sufficient value for
§ 548(c), the trustee's argument to the court centered on the lack of value in
partnership interests under the fraudulent transfer law."'5 While implicitly
dealing with the reduction of a legal claim as constituting value, AFIHolding
is and should be viewed as a decision predicated on the transformation of
an equity security to a creditor's claim.
The final question is whether the decision undermines the "equality of
distribution" policy which is the bedrock of a bankruptcy trustee's power?'86
Some could construe AFI Holding as allowing limited partnership interest-
holders to retain distributions they receive before the collapse of a debtor-
Ponzi scheme. If this were the case, then that construction may favor the
lucky partners who withdraw their funds ahead of the collapse over the
unlucky investors who are wiped out by a Ponzi scheme. Conversely, this
holding may only mark a movement by the Ninth Circuit to treat victims
of Ponzi schemes predicated on a partnership interest the same as investors
who were duped by schemes without the purchase of an equity interest. 87
By allowing investors who withdrew their principal investment before
the collapse of the Ponzi scheme to offset that amount against a potential
restitution claim, the sum of money a bankruptcy trustee will be able
to collect will be curtailed. This limits the amount available to Ponzi
scheme victims who find themselves in the hapless position of investors
at the scheme's collapse, while defrauded investors holding a non-equity
investment vehicle are afforded the use of the good faith defense because
surrendering their tort claims against the scheme provides adequate value
under § 548(c). Allowing Ponzi scheme victims who held equity stakes in
183 5 COLLIER ON BANKRupTcvsupra note 25, at 548.05[][b].
184 See Indep. Trust Corp., 577 E Supp. 2d at 1025-26; In re Jordan, 392 B.R. at 434-37.
185 In reAFI Holding, Inc., 525 F3d at 706.
186 See Schechter, supra note 14.
187 See Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners (In re Bayou Group,
LLC), 396 B.R. 81o (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2oo8). Here, the investments in this particular invest-
ment fund created a right to rescission for each investor, a right that neither the debtor-Ponzi
scheme nor the investor-defendants questioned. The investors did not have partnership in-
terests or other equity claims against the fund. Id.
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the enterprise the same good faith defense would not disrupt the equality
of distribution policy that buttresses fraudulent transfer law. In both cases,
investors who are left holding the bag when the Ponzi scheme fails cannot
collect from a previously-withdrawn investor who can successfully assert
the elements of the good faith defense. Allowing equity participants to
enjoy the defense would simply equalize the rights of all fraud victims
after a Ponzi scheme's collapse. Nevertheless, allowing the defense in
this case is a blatant disregard of the definition of "equity security" in the
Bankruptcy Code and of the theory that partnership interests redeemed by
a partner do not constitute value under § 548(c).
CONCLUSION
Ponzi schemes and their perpetrators take a horrible toll on the savings
of the investors they defraud. Many of the victims of Bernard Madoff's
investment fraud lost their entire life savings, and their only remedy now is
the chance to collect a few thousand dollars through the fraudulent transfer
laws.8 8 Ponzi schemes also affect market-wide investor confidence and
faith in market regulatory agencies, and they stand as a testament to the
worst kinds of human greed. In the famous fraud orchestrated by Charles
Ponzi, nearly all of his victims were poor Italian immigrants who could
least afford to have what little they had earned disappear. 189 Unfortunately,
this is a pattern that appears with regularity in Ponzi schemes: the most
vulnerable are the ones most often hurt.
Providing relief for the near victims of a Ponzi scheme through the
good faith defense is a laudable goal for the courts to undertake. After all,
the decision in AFI Holding provides investor-defendants of failed Ponzi
schemes the same protection that would be afforded them had the scheme
been structured not as a partnership but instead as an investment fund like
Bernard Madoff's. To provide this protection, however, the Ninth Circuit
abrogated the value element of the good faith defense, morphing an equity
interest into a creditor's claim. Through these actions, the Ninth Circuit
risks creating a precedent of blurring the other bright line rules of the
Bankruptcy Code when a particular outcome appears inequitable.
The Bankruptcy Code and bankruptcy courts should provide equal
remedies to similarly situated parties, just not at the expense of ignoring
clearly-termed statutory definitions.
188 Kevin McCoy, Madoff Client's Lawsuits Look to Others for Recompense; Legal Strategy
Targets Securities and Exchange Commission, Money Managers, Banks, USA TODAY, Mar. 4, 2009,
at MONEY6A.
189 See WALSH, supra note 30, at 3.
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